This paper develops a model of weight assignments using a pseudo-Bayesian approach that reflects investors' behavioral biases. In this parsimonious model of investor sentiment, weights induced by investors' conservative and representative heuristics are assigned to observations of the earning shocks of stock prices. Such weight assignments enable us to provide a quantitative link between some market anomalies and investors' behavioral biases. The seriousness of an anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights. New results other than the short-run overreaction and long-run overreaction can be derived and new hypotheses can be formed.
INTRODUCTION
Among many market anomalies uncovered in the last two decades, three stand out as having a long history and receiving the most substantial empirical support. They are market excess volatility, overreaction, and underreaction. Together with other market anomalies, they pose a major challenge to financial economists. To meet these challenges, advocates of behavioral biases have constructed various behavioral models to explain these anomalies. Among the behavioral biases advocated, two also stand out as having a long history and receiving much empirical supports from psychological literatures. These behavioral biases are investors' usage of the conservatism heuristics and the representativeness heuristics in making decisions. The most notable model in this direction is an early paper by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, henceforth BSV) , in which they show that underreaction in the short-run and overreaction in the long-run is a consequence of the two mentioned heuristics. However, their paper did not show that excess volatility is also a result of the conservatism and representativeness heuristics.
BSV adopt a bounded rationalism approach in which some, but not all, assumptions under the traditional rational expectations asset-pricing theory are violated. Specifically, the "consistent beliefs" made by Sargent (1993) that agents possess correct knowledge of the economic structure is assumed to be violated. In their 1998 paper, BSV assume that while earning announcements follow a random walk, investors using conservative and representative heuristics believe that the earning announcements fall into one of two regimes, a trending regime and a mean reverting regime, and transition from one regime to the other follows a Markov chain. Assuming that the investors still use a correct Bayesian methodology for decision making, BSV then deduce that such a wrong belief will lead to both short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction in the market. This paper takes a different approach from that of BSV in modeling conservatism and representativeness. We assume that the investor knows the correct model but uses a wrong updating methodology. This approach has several advantages as follows: (1) psychological literature clearly states that the two psychological biases arise from investors' attaching wrong weights to information, rather than from their adoption of a wrong model. In this paper, the weighting of information is emphasized and it is a more accurate description of the heuristics used by investors. (2) Since the wrong weights reflect the biases, different degree of biases can be assessed through considering a change in weights. As a result, the seriousness of an anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights. (3) New results other than the short-run overreaction and long-run overreaction can be derived and new hypotheses can be formed. We will elaborate on these points below.
Let us elaborate on (1). According to DeBondt and Thaler (1995) , a good finance theory must be based on psychological evidence of how people actually behave. Thus it is important to look into the psychological literature on how the behavioral biases arise. Psychologists observe that investors pay too much attention to extreme information and less attention to its validity when making judgments and decisions about their investments (Griffin and Tversky 1992) . When investors are overconfident about their analysis based on the past performance of stocks and underreact to recent information, thus updating their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence, they exhibit conservative heuristics (Edwards 1968; Grether 1980) . On the other hand, if they are overconfident about the recent information on stocks and pay less attention to the past information on stocks or extrapolate too readily from small samples, thus leading to belief revisions that are too dramatic, they demonstrate representative heuristics Kahneman 1971, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1973) . Most studies of conservative heuristics involve large samples, whereas most studies on representative heuristics involve smaller samples.
Misunderstanding the impact of sample size on the posterior mean leads investors to make conservative revisions with large samples and radical revisions with small samples. Thus it is obvious that behavioral biases arise from an inappropriate treatment of information, rather than from a misjudgment on the model.
One of the earliest papers addressing conservatism is Edwards (1968) , who reveals that people tend to make behavioral mistakes in their decisions, although they try to employ theoretical models or methodology. He observes that investors with conservative behavior might pay little attention or even ignore the full information from an earnings announcement. They may believe that this information is mainly temporary, and thus they still cling to their prior beliefs based on past earnings. As a result, they might incorporate only partial information from recent earnings announcement in their valuation of shares. In other words, they attach too little a weight to recent information. Edwards (1968) develops a Bayesian model in which individuals tend to underweigh useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful evidence used to form their priors. He observes that it takes two to five observations to do one observation's worth of work in inducing a subject to change his opinions. Grether (1980) claims that individuals who exhibit conservatism update their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence. Klein (1990) , Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) further suggest that investors tend to underreact to new information. In terms of the Bayesian rule, conservatism means that people tend to overweigh the base rate (prior) and underweigh new information. This is exactly the approach of the proposed model in this paper.
On the representative heuristic, many experiments (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler 1985; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998)] show that individuals expect key population parameters to be "represented" in any recent sequence of generated data (see Kahneman 1971, 1974 for a detailed discussion). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) suggest that local representativeness is a belief in the "law of small numbers," meaning that "the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well." Investors may find that even small samples (rather than large samples) are highly representative of the populations from which they are drawn. This simply shows that investors may place excessive weights on a sample of small size and neglect distinct information unjustifiably. The model proposed in this paper adopts this approach in modeling the law of small sample and in fact, the "smallness" of the sample will be taken into account in our model. On point (2), we remark that some key measures of market anomalies like market volatility, autocorrelation of market returns, trading profit of a self-finance long-short strategy etc, can be expressed in terms of the weights and key financial variables like risk free interest rates. The impact of the incorrect weights on the anomalous magnitudes can hence be quantitatively assessed. In so doing, we can compare the impact of conservatism and representativeness on the anomalous magnitudes. We can also study the interaction between the heuristics and the key financial variable. For example, we can show that market's excess volatility is essentially the result of the "law of small number", and under a reasonable assumption on smallness, volatility can become 28 times that of the volatility attributable to pure information, see Section III for further details.
On point (3), our behavioral model gives rise to a richer body of consequences than BSV. Other than demonstrating short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction, we also derive excess volatility as a consequence of the behavioral model. Furthermore, we can attribute the excess volatility to the representative heuristic and show that excess volatility is more prominent when the discount rate is small. On overreaction and underreaction, we demonstrate that there exists a magnitude effect in the under-and overreaction phenomena. Specifically, our model provide theoretical support for the second part of the under-and overreaction hypotheses. Recall that the first part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) is "extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite (same) direction" and the second part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis is "the more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment". In other words, if n pieces of good/bad news announcements repeatedly occur n times, the overreaction that results increases with n . Not only we can show that the autocorrelation magnitude and the trading profit increase with n , our model actually shows that these anomalous magnitudes are a convex function of n . Another consequence we can draw from the model is that the trading profit of the contrarian/momentum trading strategy increases when discount rate decreases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we construct a pseudo-Bayesian framework to model investors' conservative and representative heuristics and develop price dynamics under this model. In Section III, we study how the heuristics will impact on market volatility in equilibrium. We then outline in Section IV the implications of our proposed model by using it to demonstrate the existence of short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction in the stock market. The trading profit resulting from the corresponding momentum/ contrarian trading strategies is also derived and analyzed. In Section V, we show that our model enables us to derive an additional result that there is a "magnitude effect" associated with the under-andoverreaction in the stock market. We show further that the magnitude effect is convex in nature.
Section VI wraps up this paper with a conclusion. Some proofs are provided in the appendices.
THE MODEL
In BSV, a representative investor observes the earnings of an asset and updates his belief to price the asset. It is assumed that t N , the earnings announcement of the asset at time t , follows a random walk, i.e., 
where r is the discount rate or the investor's anticipated return. In (1), t E represents the investor's expectation given the information set t Φ , which is the set of all information available to the investor at time t . In BSV, the following assumptions are made: 
the posterior distribution of µ is given as follows:
Notice that equal weight is placed on each observation in 1 , , t y y under the Bayesian approach.
Consistent with the predictions of traditional efficient markets, this rational expectations assetpricing theory assumes that investors can have access both to the correct specification of the "true" economic model and to unbiased estimators of its coefficients; see, for example, Friedman (1979) for more information. Obviously, if the rational investor is endowed with an objectively correct prior and the correct likelihood functions, he/she will obtain the rational expectations equilibrium and thus any structural irrationally induced financial anomaly should disappear.
Attainment of such structural knowledge on convergence to a rational expectations solution has been studied widely in the literature. For example, Blume and Easley (1982) and Bray and Kreps (1987) observe that investors have to recognize and incorporate how their beliefs about the unknown essential features of the economy influence the structural model of the economy.
However, the extreme knowledge required in these models is implausible. If investors do not recognize the effect of learning on prices to obtain equilibrium, Blume and Easley (1982) have
shown that convergence of beliefs is not guaranteed within a general equilibrium learning model. 
The posterior distribution then becomes
As a result, the posterior mean and posterior variance of the unknown mean can be obtained and the price dynamic under the behavioral model can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Price dynamic under a pseudo-Bayesian approach). 
1) Under a pseudo-Bayesian approach with a vague prior and an incorrect likelihood ( )
2) The price at time t using the rational expectations pricing model in (1) The pseudo likelihood in (3) becomes 
Thus, an investor loaded with cognitive biases will adopt the posterior mean and posterior variance as stated in (5). Substituting the expression of conditional mean in (5) into (1) results in expression (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Weight assignment schemes to reflect cognitive biases
In the model above, we incorporate general weights on observations into a simple asset-pricing setup. This allows us to examine the price formation process under a rational expectations approach with biased weights. This approach enables practitioners and academics to compare ways in which investors, with or without cognitive biases, incorporate their prior beliefs into the historical data to estimate valuation-relevant parameters that can lead to anomalous asset-price behavior. We note that the idea of using different weights on evidences is not new in the finance literature. For example, Brav and Heaton (2002) 
Figure 1C. Weights (w i ) assigned to evidence i-days ago for an investor using conservatism heuristics conservatism and representativeness heuristics
For a graphical representation of the weights used by the conservative investors, see Figure 1A .
Note that the weight assignment scheme of representative heuristic in behavioral finance is often described as the tendency of experimental subjects to overweigh recent clusters of observations and underweigh older observations that would otherwise moderate beliefs. Heavy weights on recent data could be a reaction to concern with structural change. Whenever such change occurs, the weight placed on recent data will be very high or similarly the weight placed on the older data will be very low, which will result in a are equal to 1 and the investor has no behavioral bias. In this sense, the third type of investor embraces all other types. Thus, it suffices to consider investors of the third type. To fully understand the price anomalies that will be introduced when incorrect weights are assigned to the likelihood function, we investigate its implication to market volatility in Section III and investigate its implications for under-and overreaction in Sections IV and V.
MODEL'S IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCESS VOLATILITY

Market volatility under the behavioral model
Since volatility in the market is one of the most interesting aspects of finance theory, in this section, we study the magnitude of market volatility under our behavioral model. Under our behavioral model with mis-specified weights i ω 's, the asset price t P measured in a log-scale follows a stochastic process given by (6) in which the earnings i y 's are i.i.d. 
Market volatility at equilibrium
Notice that when t is small, the investor is still learning about the economic structure. The learning process becomes complete when t gets large. Since we want to distinguish whether the excess volatility is contributed by learning or by behavioral biases, we study the equilibrium situation when t tends to infinity. We adopt this same treatment when we study over-and underreaction in the later sections as well. 
This completes the proof of the proposition.
In Proposition 2, market volatility is decomposed into two parts: the volatility due to information uncertainty and the volatility arising from behavioral biases. Specifically, the volatility due to information uncertainty is given by 
It is interesting to compare the volatilities arising from these two different sources by computing their ratio. Dividing (11) by (10), the volatilities ratio is equal to 
Expression (12) shows that the ratio depends on the mis-specified weights s ' i ω . Since earnings announcements are usually made quarterly, the time period from t to 1 t + can be taken to represent one quarter of a year and hence r could be the discount rate for one quarter of a year.
To have a better idea of the magnitude of this ratio, we consider the following special case: 
Obviously, from this ratio, the percentage of excess volatility increases as 0 p decreases. Since Other than the magnitude of the excess volatility, we can make three interesting observations about excess volatility.
Observation 1. Excess volatility is a decreasing function of the discount rate or investor's anticipated return r .
This observation follows trivially from (12) because the volatility ratio depends on r r + 1 which increases as r decreases.
Observation 2. Conservative heuristics will reduce excess volatility.
This observation follows from a simple computation of the partial derivative ω means that the investor is more conservative, the conservative heuristic actually reduces excess volatility.
Observation 3. Representative heuristics will increase excess volatility.
This observation follows from a simple computation of the partial derivative 
MODELS' IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDER-AND OVERREACTION
Measures of Under-and Overreaction
Overreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from bad (good) past performance, while underreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from good (bad) past performance (DeBondt and Thaler 1985; LSV) . In this paper, we further investigate how investors' cognitive biases affect the resulting prices of an asset in the hope of explaining the underreaction and overreaction phenomena in stock markets. In many empirical studies, under-and overreaction are addressed in a portfolio context (DeBondt and Thaler 1985 , 1990 Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) in which winner and loser portfolios are constructed by picking the best and worst performers in the formation period, respectively. Underreaction and overreaction are then defined according to the subsequent performance of the winner and loser portfolios in the test period. In the literature, alternative approaches are also employed to study the under-and overreaction phenomena by examining the time series properties of the prices of a single asset. In the context of a single asset, under-and overreaction could be demonstrated either through return autocorrelations (DHS) or through the abnormal return under an event approach (BSV). In this paper, both approaches are employed to illustrate the under-and overreaction phenomena documented by psychologists. Section IV.A.1 adopts a correlation approach and Section IV.A.2 deals with the same concept using an event approach.
Under-and-overreaction in terms of correlation coefficients
Consider the k-period return k t t R + , from time t to time t k + and the k-period return,
− to time t . The correlation coefficient between these two returns can be interpreted as the lag-one autocorrelation of the k-period return. Since underreaction is associated with positive autocorrelation and overreaction is associated with negative autocorrelation, we define short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as follows:
(I). Prices of a single asset exhibit a short-term underreaction (in terms of return correlation) if
the k-period return has a positive lag-one autocorrelation for sufficiently small k.
(II). Prices of a single asset exhibit a long-term overreaction (in terms of return correlation) if the k-period return has a negative lag-one autocorrelation for sufficiently large k.
We note that the above definition of under-and overreaction is consistent with the mean reversion phenomena reported by Fama and French (1988) 
Under-and-overreaction under an event approach
Analogous to the definition of underreaction and overreaction in terms of correlation coefficients at the start of the previous subsection, we now discuss an alternative way to measure under-and overreaction as in the event approach used by BSV. Under this approach, the market is said to have underreacted when the average return on the company's stock in a period following an announcement of good news is higher than that in a period following an announcement of bad news. Quoting BSV, "The stock under-reacts to the good news, a mistake which is corrected in the following period, giving a higher return at that time." However, when pieces of news come in continuing strings, the opposite phenomenon may occur. Put differently, the average return following a series of good news announcements turns out to be lower than that following a series of bad news announcements. This is described as the long-term overreaction phenomenon documented in psychology. 
In (13) is positive, the momentum trading strategy is profitable resulting from a market underreaction. Otherwise, the contrarian trading strategy is profitable, signifying the existence of an overreaction. A formal definition of short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction can now be given as follows:
(III). Prices exhibit a short-term underreaction if
for sufficiently small j .
(IV). Prices exhibit a long-term overreaction if
for sufficiently large j .
Notice that the short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as defined above are by no means mutually exclusive. Just like the existence of constants 1 K and 2 K in the previous section, constants 1 J and 2 J can both exist, so that 0
Under-and-overreaction in the presence of behavioral biases
In this Section, we assume that the representative investor possesses both conservative and representative heuristics and assigns weights to data as described by (C) in Section III. We will show in Proposition 3 that asset prices will exhibit underreaction in the short run and overreaction in the long run, where under-and overreaction is measured by return autocorrelations. Proposition 3 is important because it shows that our behavioral model implies that returns are predictable, a well-documented market anomaly in the finance literature. In Proposition 3, predictability results even after the system has reached equilibrium and hence it does not arise only from the investors' learning process. We then demonstrate short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction phenomena using an event approach in Proposition 4.
Specifically, for both under-and overreaction, we further define in Section V what we mean by a "magnitude effect," alternatively known as the second part of the under-or overreaction hypothesis. We then prove in Proposition 5 that when investors exhibit both types of behavioral biases, the under-and overreaction observed in Proposition 4 displays a "magnitude effect." for sufficiently large t , we have (6) and (7), we can represent the k-period return,
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients in (i) is non-trivial for sufficiently large t , i.e. (ii)
, in terms of the return shocks i y 's. Assuming that t is large, we have From (14), we can easily show that As explained in Section IV.A.2, under-and overreaction can also be treated using an event approach. Under this approach, under-and overreaction is measured by the expected momentum profit ) , ( j s U t defined in (13). We will show in Proposition 4 below that when an investor possesses both types of behavioral biases, ) , ( j s U t is positive when j is small and is negative when j is large. In other words, momentum trading is profitable on a short run of good or bad news but contrarian trading is profitable on a long-run of good or bad news. This signifies shortterm underreaction and long-term overreaction. , and
in which Z represents a standard normal random variable with mean zero and unit standard deviation.
Proof:
From (8), and denote the return from period t to 1 t + by (16) Thus it is obvious that the representative heuristic has to overpower the conservative heuristic for a contrarian profit to surface. The long-run assumption is necessary for a contrarian profit because under a long-run situation the representativeness bias will become noticeable. On the other hand, the momentum profit when j is small arises from the conservative heuristic and the representative heuristic plays no role in determining the momentum profit.
Another interesting observation is that both momentum/contrarian profits are sensitive to the discount rate r . The smaller the discount rate, the larger the momentum/contrarian profits. This is because when r is small, future cash flows become important, and a mis-estimation of future cash flows will intensify the over-or underreaction phenomena.
MODEL'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAGNITUDE EFFECT
Existence of a magnitude effect
In this Section, we will provide theoretical support for the second part of the under-and overreaction hypotheses. Recall that the first part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) is "extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite (same) direction" and the second part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis is "the more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment." Even though the empirical tests and/or theoretical explanations of the first part of the overreaction hypothesis have been heavily studied and uncovered by financial economists, the second part of the overreaction hypothesis is seldom systematically addressed by researchers. In this paper, we show that our quantitative behavioral model can provide theoretical support to the second part of the under-and overreaction hypotheses by showing that the magnitude effect exists under our behavioral
stands for the expected profit of the momentum trading strategy. Observe that both parameters s and j represent an "event magnitude." For the parameter s , the larger is s , the more extreme is the earnings shock, and the more extreme is the event under study. On the other hand, the parameter j represents another dimension of "event magnitude." If j is large, the event consists of a bigger clustering of good or bad news and the event becomes more extreme as j gets larger. Thus the "magnitude effect" associated with the under-or overreaction may have two meanings:
(1) the momentum (contrarian) profit ( ) ( The proof that ( ) D s is monotonically increasing in s goes as follows: ω + decreases as j increases, the contrarian profit increases as j increases and the momentum profit decreases as j increases.
Convexity in the magnitude effect
In Section IV.A, we demonstrate that there is a magnitude effect in the under-or-overreaction phenomena, in the sense that momentum/contrarian trading profit increases with the magnitude of the earnings shock. In this Section, we go one step further to show in Proposition 7 that when s is used as a magnitude measure, the magnitude effect is convex in nature. For example, when magnitude doubles, the momentum/contrarian trading profit is more than doubled. 
